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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

PERRY BUCKNER, et al.,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,
-vsAARON KENNARD, as Sheriff of Salt
Lake County; SALT LAKE COUNTY;
SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S
OFFICE; and SALT LAKE COUNTY
DEPUTY SHERIFFS' MERIT SERVICE
COMMISSION,

Case No. 20020178-SC

Defendants/Appellants.
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Article 8, §3 of
the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2002).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES/PRESERVATION
1. Did the trial court err in not dismissing the statutory (i.e., noncontract) claims of
the 105 Plaintiff Deputies who did not file a notice of claim, a jurisdictional prerequisite
under the Governmental Immunity Act?
2. Did the newly assigned trial judge erroneously conclude that the law of the case
doctrine prevented him from revisiting on summary judgment issues raised by the County
in its Motion to Dismiss?
3. Did the trial court erroneously conclude that the County was collaterally estopped
or barred by res judicata from defending itself on the contract and statutory claims by a
settlement the County had reached in 1994 with other Deputies in a similar wage dispute?
4. Do the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act, Utah Code Ann. §17-30-5, the County
Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §17-33-5, and/or the County's implementing
policies create an employment contract for an "equitable" compensation plan that is
enforceable by the Deputies in an action for breach of contract?
5. Do the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act, Utah Code Ann. §17-30-5, the County
Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §17-33-5, and/or the County's implementing
policies create in the Deputies a private statutory right of action to challenge the
compensation plan as "inequitable" and obtain monetary damages in the form of back
wages?
6. Even if there is such a private statutory right of action, is the County nonetheless
immune from liability under the Governmental Immunity Act for claims resulting from the
governmental function of adoption and use of the challenged compensation plan and
policies?
7. In any event, is the County entitled to judgment on such a private statutory right
of action because the County fully complied with statutory mandates and its own policies?

2

8. Would the County be entitled to judgment on the Deputies' statutory claims
anyway because the statute of limitations applicable to claims created by statute expired in
1991, three years after the challenged compensation plan and policies were adopted?
9. Did the trial court erroneously award prejudgment interest on the back wages
awarded 92 Plaintiff Deputies determined to have been underpaid under the challenged
compensation plan and policies?
These issues were raised below in the County defendants' Motion and Memorandum
to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint [R. 126-174], Answer to Third Amended Complaint
[R. 403-412], Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [R.
432-694], Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 28072819], and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment [R.
2820-2849], as well as at the hearings held on June 3,1996 [R. 4178], June 4,2001 [R.4178]
and December 4, 2000 [R. 4181]. On the day of the evidentiary hearing, held only to
calculate damages, the County defendants again raised these issues [R.4181] .
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The propriety of a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss under rule
12(b)(6) is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Cruz v. Middlekauf Lincoln-Mercury.
Inc.. 909 P.2d 1252,1253 (Utah 1996). Such a dismissal should be granted only if it is clear
that the claimant is not entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proved in
support of the claim. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.3d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The trial court's
conclusions of law on summary judgment are accorded no particular deference, and the
appellate court reviews such conclusions for correctness. Harline v. Barker. 912 P.2d 433,
438 (Utah 1996); Schurtz v. BMW North America. Inc., 814 P.2d 1108,1111 (Utah 1991).

3

In this case, both sides moved for summary judgment. Therefore, when reviewing
the order granting summary judgment to the Deputies, the appellate court views the
undisputed facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
County defendants, the non-moving party. However, when reviewing the order denying the
County defendants' motion for summary judgment, the appellate court views the undisputed
facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the Deputies, the
non-moving party. See Surety Underwriters v. E&C Trucking, Inc.. 2000 UT 71,10 P.3d
388.

RELEVANT PROVISIONS
The following provisions are relevant to a determination of these issues and are
reprinted in Addendum A: Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-5; Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-5; Utah Code
Ann. §63-30-3(1); Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(1); Utah Code Ann. §63-30-11(12); Utah
Code Ann. §63-30-13; Utah Code Ann. §78-12-26(4); Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25; and Utah
Constitution Article 14, §3.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final judgment entered by Third District Judge Stephen
Henriod in January 2002 in favor of 92 Plaintiff Deputies (out of a total 124 Plaintiff
Deputies) for $705,190 in back pay, plus $ 101,051 in back overtime pay and back retirement
contributions, all for the 4 lA year-period from May 1, 1990 to September 1, 1994. In
4

addition, prejudgment interest on the back pay was awarded from September 1,1994 at a rate
of 7.34% per annum.
No trial was held in this case on the question of liability for the alleged pay inequities
because the trial court determined, in resolving competing Motions for Summary Judgment,
that defendants were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel from defending themselves
on either the contract or statutory causes of action asserted by plaintiffs. The trial court
premised this conclusion on a voluntary nonjudicial settlement reached in a previous wage
dispute between the County and a different group of deputies, referred to here as the
Diamant group.
Thus, an evidentiary hearing was held in the instant case only on the issue of damages,
with the court refusing to identify the nature of the County's liability, i.e., whether it was
contractual or statutory. The court calculated back pay damages for 92 of the 124 plaintiff
Deputies by applying the same methods used in the earlier Diamant out-of-court settlement.
The County filed a timely Notice of Appeal to challenge the final judgment as well
as the interlocutory rulings that merged into it. [R. 4058-4090; R. 4128-4130].

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Salt Lake County is mandated by the County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 17-33-1 et seq., and the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-1 et seq.,
to hire its employees using the merit systems established by those Acts and to adopt a
comprehensive classification plan so that the same qualifications may reasonably be required
5

for, and the same schedule of pay may be applied to, all positions in the same class. Section
17-33-5(3)(a) directs the Commission to adopt personnel rules to carry out these goals.
Accordingly, the County established two merit systems, one under the former statute that
pertains to civilian employees and a second system under the latter statute that pertains to
sworn deputies, such as the plaintiffs in the instant case.
For the period of time in question, from 1998 until September 1, 1994,1 Salt Lake
County had one pay plan that was applied to both systems. Employees were assigned a pay
grade based upon their classification. Each pay grade had an assigned salary range with a
minimum and a maximum salary. Salt Lake County Commissioners retained the authority to
grant annual merit increases and cost of living adjustments. The Salt Lake County
Commissioners also retained the authority to deny annual increases or to determine the dates
on which increases were provided. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-7(2)(d)(1996);id. §17-3315(1) (1996). It is undisputed that merit increases were given County wide. [R. 4181 at 15354; R.. 2296 at 125; R 2284 at 77-78 ; R. 2286 at 85].
By statute, the Personnel Director was assigned to determine if changes to the salary
ranges were necessary based upon market conditions.

Recommended changes were

submitted to the legislative body for approval. The Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs' Merit
Commission (hereafter, "the Commission"), an independent administrative body, had
statutory authority to set policy governing the sworn deputies. Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-5(3)

]

The Deputies admitted they were compensated equitably after September 1, 1994,
when the County adopted a new pay plan.
6

(1996). The Commission adopted Policy 5110 on November 2, 1988 and it remained in
effect until March 29, 1994. [Addendum B, R. 2214]. This policy, the primary source of
the pay inequities alleged by the Deputies, provided incoming employees an adjustment on
the pay scale at a rate of 5% for every two years of qualifying outside law enforcement
experience. [Addendum B, R. 2215-2218; R. 2833-2834]. 2
In response to employee complaints about the pay plan, the Commission formed a
committee to advise it about the causes of a less senior employee passing a more senior
employee on the pay plan. [R. 461]. Some of the problems identified by the committee date
back to legislative decisions made in 1980. [R.2286]. In its April 1991 Committee Report
[Addendum C, R. 459-498], the committee identified six actions that could have caused a
leap-frogging of a less senior employee over a more senior employee: the County's
legislative body had denied a merit increase, varied the amounts of merit increases, varied
the dates on which merit increases were given, or withheld or delayed an increase in pay
after an employee served a probationary period; the Personnel Director, based upon market
conditions, had made adjustments to the salary range for select job classifications; and
Commission Policy 5110 was applied to individual employees and their compensation was
adjusted based upon prior law enforcement experience with an employer other than Salt Lake
County. [R. 2986-87].

2

The policy provides in point 6.0, Prior Experience Adjustment: "Newly hired
deputy sheriffs with prior equivalent certified experience are entitled to an extra pay
increase of 5% per credited year, in addition to the 5% probationary increase awarded
employees at the end of six months of satisfactory job performance. For each full year
the employee is credited with one-half year experience."
7

In March 1992 a large group of Salt Lake County deputies, relying on the Committee
Report, filed a lawsuit concerning their wage dispute, Diamantv. Kennard. They alleged
causes of action for the violation of the federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203, and the state
constitution. [Diamant Complaint. R. 505-519]. The parties ultimately reached a pretrial
stipulation in which the Daimant plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their complaint with prejudice
and release the County defendants (the Sheriff and the County Commissioners) from all
claims for damages arising from the lawsuit.3 The defendants voluntarily agreed that each
of the plaintiffs could seek a remedy for his or her back pay claims by filing a notice of
grievance with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office before November 30, 1994. After a
hearing on each filed grievance before the nonlawyer arbitrator Robert R. Adams, the parties
agreed, "any decision by the Arbitrator would be final and binding on the grievants and Salt
Lake County." [Addendum D, Stipulation, R. 862-69]. This stipulation resulted in an order
dismissing the Diamant lawsuit with prejudice. [Addendum D, R. 148]
After notices of grievances were filed, the arbitrator examined each grievanf s claim
of pay inequity or gross unfairness and awarded some grievants back pay without identifying
the source of that liability. The awards were made in several orders issued by Adams from
June through November 1996 [Addendum E, R. 2776-2788 (unsigned copies)].4
In the meantime, nineteen other Deputy Sheriffs employed by the Salt Lake County

3

No class was certified in the Diamant lawsuit prior to its dismissal with prejudice.
[R. 2755, t 3].
4

None of the awards was confirmed as a judgment under the Arbitration Act, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-31 a-1 et seq.
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Sheriffs Office filed a Notice of Claim in August 1995 with Salt Lake County, claiming
entitlement to back

pay because of the County's use of an allegedly inequitable

compensation scheme in violation of Utah Code Ann. §17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii).5 [ Notice of
Claim, Addendum F, R. 885]. Five months later, these nineteen deputies and forty-five other
deputies (who had never filed a notice of claim) commenced the instant action, contending
they were not paid equally with others who were in the same pay step and had similar
training and experience. They sought an award of back pay based on separate causes of
action for the County's denial (until September 1, 1994)6 of their statutory and contractual
entitlements to be paid equitably. They claimed that the County has a statutory obligation
under sections 17-30-5 and 17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii) to equitably apply the same schedule of pay
to all employees of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office. [Addendum G, Third Amended
Complaint, Tf 20, R. 885]. They also claimed that a contractual relationship was created by
Utah statutes, County policies and Commission policies. [Addendum G, R. 263; Response
to Interrogatory 14, R. 1798]. In addition, they asserted a cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation. [Addendum G, R. 262]. Sixty more plaintiffs, none of whom had filed
a Notice of Claim, were later added to the complaint, for a total of 124 plaintiff Deputies.

5

These nineteen deputies are identified on the list of plaintiffs, supra at i-ii, with a
• before their names.
6

See note 1. supra.
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[See R. 333-335; R. 254-256].7
In this action, the Deputies claim that: (a) the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 17-30-5, and the County Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §17-33-5, in
conjunction with Commission Policy 5110, create an enforceable employment contract that
requires equitable compensation; and (b) the County's failure to compensate the Deputies
equitably violates these same statutes and policies. The Deputies based their causes of action
for breach of contract and statutory violation on the County's use of a compensation system
that allowed deputies with similar amounts of seniority in County service to be paid
differently. [Addendum G, R. 254-287].
The County defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss: the noncontractual (i.e., statutory)
claims because the Notice of Claim was untimely under the Governmental Immunity Act; all
claims of all plaintiffs for failure to state a cognizable claim for breach of contract or
violation of state law; all claims of all plaintiffs as barred by the statute of limitations; and
all statutory claims for damages as precluded by governmental immunity.

[Motion to

Dismiss, R. 126-174].

7

These 60 belated plaintiffs, represented by the same counsel as in the instant case,
were not plaintiffs in the Diamant lawsuit and did not participate in the arbitration process
agreed to in the Diamant stipulation. They submitted the question of their right to do so
to the Commission, but were rejected. In response, they filed an action in Third District
Court challenging the Commission's ruling. Taylor v. Salt Lake County Deputy
Sheriffs' Merit Serv. Comm'n. Case No. 950906023. However, this action was dismissed
in November 1996 in an unappealed judgment concluding that the Commission had
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to even consider the deputies' claims. [R. 871-876].
10

Third District Judge William Bohling denied the Motion to Dismiss, summarily
concluding that: the one-year period for filing a notice of claim under Utah Code Ann. § 6330-13 (1995) does not apply to the Deputies' claims for breach of contract and statutory
entitlement; the statute of limitations applicable to the Deputies' claims for breach of contract
and statutory violation is four years, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25 (1995), and the County did
not establish that the deputies had failed to file their action within this period; and the
Deputies had pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of contract. [Addendum H,
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, July 7, 2000, R. 209-214].
After discovery and reassignment of the case to Third District Judge Stephen L.
Henriod, the County defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims.
[Addendum I, R. 432-2259]. They asserted that: the court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
statutory (i.e., non-contract) causes of action of the plaintiffs who had not filed a notice of
claim required by Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 and-13; the Deputies failed to state a breach
of contract claim as the statutes and policies relied on by the Deputies do not create an
enforceable employment contract with these public employees for equitable compensation;
the Deputies failed to state a statutory claim because there is no private right of action for
backpay damages to enforce Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-5 or § 17-33-5 and, if there were, it
was barred by the 3-year statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4); the claims
were barred by the Governmental Immunity Act; the misrepresentation claims are precluded
by governmental immunity that has not been waived; and the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
11

Office and the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Service Commission are not subject
to suit under the Governmental Immunity Act and Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-1 et seq.
Alternatively, the County argued it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both
the contract or statutory causes of action because the compensation plan complies with the
statutes and is not inequitable, even though it permits employees in the same pay grade to be
paid differently based on differences in law enforcement experience outside of County
employment. [Addendum I, Motion and Memo for Summary Judgment, R. 432-694;
Addendum K, Memo in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 28202849].
In response, the Deputies opposed the County's motion and filed their own crossMotion for Partial Summary Judgment on the issue of entitlement to back pay. They
contended that: Judge Henriod was precluded by the law of the case doctrine from
reconsidering the questions decided adversely to the County in Judge Bohling's denial of the
Motion to Dismiss, [Addendum J, R. 2761 -2762]; because the arbitrator's orders had already
awarded the Diamant group of deputies back pay on their claims of "gross unfairness" in
their pay, res judicata and collateral estoppel precluded the County from relitigating in this
action any defenses to the pay inequity claims, whether they were actually raised in the
arbitration proceedings or could have been raised [Addendum J, R. 2759-2761]; the
Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to equitable claims like those of the plaintiffs;
and, even if it did, plaintiffs have complied with the Act. [Addendum J, Plaintiffs'
Motion/Memorandum, R. 2746-2762].
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Even if the merits of the County's defenses were reached, the Deputies argued, the
trial court should reject them and award judgment in plaintiffs' favor because they have
properly stated and established a claim for breach of an employment contract and a private
right of action to enforce the statutory requirement of an equitable pay plan. [Addendum J,
R. 2763-2765]. Moreover, the Governmental Immunity Act does not apply because the
Deputies' claims are seeking back wages as equitable relief. [Addendum J, R. 2767-2768].
Even if a notice of claim was required, the Deputies continued, section 63-30-5 was
satisfied for the 105 deputies whose names were not given in the notice filed by the nineteen
named deputies because it included the language "and others whose identities are not known
at this time." [Addendum J, R. 2768-2769]. Finally, the Deputies argued, they were entitled
to recover back pay from September 1,1994, all the way back to March 28,1988, four years
before the day the Daimant lawsuit was originally filed [Addendum J, R. 2770-2772].
Additionally, the County was estopped from asserting the defense of statute of limitations
because the Sheriff had discouraged them from taking action. [Addendum J, R. 2772].
In reply, the County again told Judge Henriod he was free to revisit the issues decided
by Judge Bohling, notwithstanding the law of the case doctrine. The County also reaffirmed
that adoption of hiring policies and a compensation plan is immunized by the Governmental
Immunity Act. The County opposed application of res judicata or collateral estoppel based
on what had transpired in the Diamant case because neither the parties, the claims, nor the
issues were the same and there was no final judgment for purposes of those doctrines. The
County denied that the Diamant lawsuit was a class action, distinguished the claims asserted
13

in that untried lawsuit from those in this action, and pointed out that the settlement agreement
in that case by its terms applied only to the Diamant plaintiffs. Furthermore, the arbitrator
was not charged with, and did not determine that either Utah law, Commission Policy 5110,
or any employment contract was violated.
In any event, the County was entitled to judgment on the merits of the Deputies'
claims. No evidence before the trial court showed the Deputies had been paid inequitably;
instead, the uncontroverted affidavit submitted by the County demonstrated that in each case
Policy 5110 was applied as written. Application of Policy 5110 did not violate the law or any
contract for "equitable" pay because it is not "inequitable" to give newly-hired deputies
credit for their law enforcement experience with an employer other than the County. In
support, the County submitted deposition testimony from the Sheriff and Susan Biesele,
Sheriffs Office Human resource manager, disputing that they had ever discouraged the
deputies who were not part of the Diamant case from initiating their own actions. [R. 2292;
R. 2668-2669; R. 2674; see also R. 2820-2849; R. 2807-2819].
With regard to the statute of limitations issue, the County contended that even if the
Deputies stated a cognizable statutory cause of action, it was governed by the three-year
statute of limitations in section 78-12-26(4) and the Deputies must strictly comply with the
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11(2) and -13, by filing a notice of
claim within one year of when their claim arose. The County argued the claims arose on the
earliest of each deputy's date of hire or November 2, 1988, the date of adoption of Policy
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5110, which allowed the County to give newly-hired deputies credit for their outside
employment. The County also noted that the Deputies' claims for money damages, under
either a contract breach or statutory violation theory, are actions at law, not equity. Finally,
the County argued that the Deputies, even if entitled to some form of relief to enforce the
governing statutes, were limited to prospective relief and could not collect monetary damages
for back pay. [Addendum K, R. 2820-2849; R. 2807-2819].
In reply, the Deputies relied heavily on the 1991 committee report and contended they
were entitled, through application of res judicata and collateral estoppel, to the same relief
the Diamant plaintiffs had obtained in their out-of- court settlement, i.e., back wages to
rectify the perceived unfairness in pay prior to September 1, 1994. They claimed to be in
privity with the Diamant plaintiffs who recovered under the settlement agreement because
they have a similar interest in recovering back wages.
The Deputies insisted that the County, on the other hand, was not allowed to defend
itself but was bound by the prior determinations of the arbitrator in Diamant and Judge
Bohling in the instant case. All defensive arguments that were raised before the arbitrator,
or that could have been raised, were precluded. Moreover, the Deputies urged the trial court
to use the recovery period used by the Diamant arbitrator to award back pay: May 1, 19908
to September 1, 1994. [R. 2983].

8

This date was apparently selected because it is one year before the Diamant
plaintiffs filed their Notice of Claim on April 30, 1991. [See R. 501-505].
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In a perfunctory two-page order issued December 4, 2000, Judge Henriod denied
almost all of the County's Motion for Summary Judgment9 and granted all of the Deputies'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Purporting to follow the law of the case doctrine and
adhere to Judge Bohling's order denying the County's Motion to Dismiss, Judge Henriod
concluded that: the Deputies' claims were not barred by the Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10; the Deputies stated a recognizable claim for breach of contract;
and the 105 Deputies whose names did not appear in the Notice of Claim could nonetheless
proceed with their suit. Additionally, applying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, the Deputies "are entitled to back pay under the arbitrator's order" because "the
issues decided in arbitration were sufficiently similar to the issues in the present case to meet
the requirements of privity." [Addendum L, Order on Motions for Partial and Full Summary
Judgment, R. 3008-3011]. He also ordered a trial date to determine the amount of damages
owed each individual plaintiff who was inequitably compensated. [Id.].
None of the three subsequent requests for clarification by the County resulted in the
trial court identifying the legal basis for the County's liability for back wages or the statute
of limitations applicable. [See R. 2023-2042; R. 3047-3052; R. 3065-68 ; R. 3345-3356 ].
Thereafter, the trial court ignored the issues of any bar to suit imposed by a statute of

9

The court's order dated June 12,2001 [R.3065-3068], clarifies that the Salt Lake
County Deputy Sheriffs Merit Commission and the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office
were dismissed as defendants and the cause of action for negligent misrepresentation was
dismissed.
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limitations or by when the Deputies' claims arose, simply using the 4-year-and-4-month
recovery period used by the Diamant arbitrator. [R. 3023-25, R. 3936, R. 4179 at 7; R. 4181
atl].
Judge Henriod ordered the parties to calculate back pay damages for the plaintiff
Deputies by applying the same method used by the arbitrator after the Diamant out-of-court
settlement: a plaintiff deputy was to be awarded back wages if s/he could identify someone
else employed by the Sheriffs Office with less seniority with the County (but with the same
job classification) who was making more money. [R. 2983].
Most Deputies presented no evidence regarding the causes for pay differentials. The
parties presented the court with a stipulated list of damages for 110 of the plaintiffs, reached
using the Diamant arbitrator's formula. The parties were not able to stipulate on the damage
calculations for the 14 other plaintiffs, about whom evidence was presented to the trial court.
[R. 4181]. The County objected to any calculation of damages for them that diverged from
the Diamant formula, such as by using two purportedly "comparable" employees who were
not in the same job classification (e.g., comparing a higher ranked Deputy with a Sargeant).
Under the arbitrator's formula, they were not entitled to damages. [R. 4181 at 16]. The trial
judge and opposing counsel acknowledged that the arbitrator did not address all fact
situations. [R 4181 at 176, 182]. Nonetheless, the court awarded damages to all 14.10

10

The names of these 14 plaintiffs are: R. Damewood, J. Everett, W. Gray, D.
Kirk, L. Lucero, K Lindgren, S. Miller, T. Naylor, K. Ownby, R. Parkin, A. Spencer, K.
Taylor, K. Werner, and D. Winters.
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Final judgment was entered by Judge Henriod in January 2002 in favor of 92 Plaintiff
Deputies (out of a total 124 Plaintiff Deputies) for $705,190 in back pay, plus $101,051 in
back overtime pay and back retirement contributions, all for the 4 Vi year- period from May
1, 1990 to September 1, 1994. In addition, prejudgment interest on the back pay was
awarded from September 1, 1994 at a rate of 7.34% per annum. [Addendum M, Judgment,
January 23, 2002, R. 4015-4024; Ruling re Statute of Limitations, R. 3081; Supplemental
Judgment, R. 4032; R. 4120-4127).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
After a series of erroneous rulings, the trial court awarded the Deputies over one
million dollars in damages without allowing the County to challenge the viability of the
asserted causes of action for contract breach and statutory violation, or to defend these claims
onthemerits.
The Deputies' complaint alleged two causes of action for the court's consideration.
The first was based on a violation of law and cited Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-5 and § 17-335(3)(b)(xiii). The second alleged breach of an employment contract purportedly created by
these statutes and the County's policies implementing the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act. But
the Deputies' claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
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Then the trial court concluded that the Deputies had stated a cause of action upon
which relief could be granted under both theories. However, 105 of the plaintiff Deputies
did not file a notice of claim, required by the Governmental Immunity Act; thus, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to consider their statutory claims. Even the 19 who did file a notice
of claim could not state a private statutory right of action to enforce the Deputy Sheriffs'
Merit Act. Likewise, the statutes and implementing policies did not create an employment
contract supplementing the Deputies' statutory rights as public employees.
At the summary judgment stage, the trial court applied res judicata and collateral
estoppel and barred the County from defending itself on the merits of the Deputies' two
causes of action. This ruling was based on an out-of-court settlement with other deputies
after their back pay lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice in December 1994. The County
was summarily held liable, and trial was permitted only on the issues of damages.
The County respectfully asks this Court to vacate the trial court's grant of summary
judgment and damages to the Deputies and either remand the case for dismissal of all claims
of all plaintiff Deputies or enter summary judgment in the County's favor.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE 105 PERSONS NOT NAMED IN THE NOTICE
OF CLAIM, A REQUIREMENT OF THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT, ARE JURISDICTIONALLY BARRED
FROM PURSUING ANY CLAIM OTHER THAN ONE
FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT.
The trial court erroneously treated both causes of action, breach of contract and
statutory entitlement, as actions exempt from the notice of claim requirements in the
Governmental Immunity Act. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 63-30-5, immunity from suit is
waived as to any contractual obligation and, thus, no notice of claim is required for an action
to recover on contract; however, no such waiver of immunity exists for a claim based upon
a statutory violation. Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT 49, ^[13, 26 P.3d 217; Stralevv. Halliday.
2000 UT App 38,fflf14-16, 997 P.2d 338.
The only notice of claim filed in this case is dated August 29,1995. The notice names
only 19 persons who claim entitlement to recovery of back wages for an alleged violation of
section 17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii).n The only additional information in the notice as to the
possibility of other persons claiming entitlement is the wording " and others whose identities
are not known at this time." [Addendum F, Notice of Claim].

n

Section 17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii) is part of the County Personnel Management Act,
which applies to "all positions in the career service ... ." Section 17-30-5, which is not
identified in the Notice of Claim, is part of the Deputy Sheriffs -Merit System statute.
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On January 23, 1996, sixty-four plaintiffs, including the 19 named in the notice of
claim, filed a complaint and alleged violation of sections 17-30-5 and 17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii). On
August 16,1996, the complaint was amended to increase the number of plaintiffs to 124. At
no time during the procedural history of this case did the additional 105 plaintiffs file a notice
of claim or amend the August 29,1995 Notice of Claim prior to (or after) commencing this
action.12
This Court has "consistently and uniformly held that suits may not be brought against
the state or its subdivisions unless the requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act are
strictly followed." Hall v. Utah State Department of Corrections. 2001 UT 34, |23,24 P.3d
958 (citing Roosendaal Construction & Mining Corp. v. Holman. 503 P.2d 446,448 (Utah
1972)). "[T]he Governmental Immunity Act's notice of claim requirement is not subject to
exception, even if the governmental entity at issue has effective notice of the claim." Id. at
962. The failure to strictly comply with the notice of claim requirement of the Immunity Act
deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction and "requires the trial court to dismiss a
complaint." Greene v. Utah Transit Authority. 37 P.3d 1156,1159 (2001) (citing Thomas v.
Lewis. 2001 UT 491fl3, 26 P.3d 217).
Section 63-30-11(2) of the Governmental Immunity Act provides in pertinent part that
"[a]ny person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity ... shall file a notice

12

For purposes of this argument, the County assumes that sections 17-30-5 and 1733-5(3) (b) (xii) create a private right of action for money damages. See Point V for the
County's argument that they do not.
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of claim with the entity before maintaining an action...." The codified rules of statutory
construction provide that the term "person" is defined as including "individuals, bodies
politic and corporate, partnership, associations, and companies." Utah Code Ann. § 68-312(2)(o) (Supp. 2002).
The question becomes whether a Notice of Claim using the language "and others whose
identities are not known at this time" strictly complies with the directive in Section 63-3011(2) that "any person" who has a claim must file a notice of claim. The Utah Supreme
Court case of Pigs Gun Club Inc. v. Sanpete County. 2002 UT 17,42 P.3d 379, is dispositive
of this issue. In Pigs Gun Club Inc.. Sanpete County increased the height of a lane, causing
excess water to flood the landowners' property. A group of landowners filed suit against
Sanpete County. Not all of the plaintiffs were named in the notice of claim, so the trial court
dismissed all claims of those who did not file a notice of claim. On appeal the "Plaintiffs
argue[d] that this notice was sufficient for all plaintiffs because 'there is no case law... [that]
asserts that the Act requires a specific name to be on the notice of claim when all the
governmental entities involved know who the plaintiffs are.'" This Court resolved the issue
by looking to the plain language of section 63-30-11(2) that "clearly requires any person
filing suit against a government agency to file a notice of claim.... In other words, each
plaintiffs name must be on the notice of claim." Id. at ^f 10 (citations omitted; emphasis
added).
On the issue of actual notice, the court reaffirmed the requirement of strict
compliance: "Although the purpose of a notice of claim is to provide the governmental entity
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an opportunity to correct the condition that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps
settle the matter without the expense of litigation ... we have consistently held that those
purposes are fulfilled only by timely filing of a notice of claim-even when the entity charged
had actual notice of the circumstances of the claim." Id. (citations omitted).
In this case, Salt Lake County is in a worse position than Sanpete County, which at
least had a date and location of the event giving rise to the cause of action. The best that can
be ascertained from the August 1995 Notice of Claim is that an unknown number of career
service county employees, whether retired, terminated or presently employed, seek to bring
suit for back pay for an unspecified period of time.
The trial court erred in failing to dismiss the statutory claims of any and every plaintiff
Deputy who was not personally named in the August 1995 Notice of Claim.
II.
THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE DOES NOT PREVENT
A NEWLY ASSIGNED DISTRICT COURT JUDGE FROM
RECONSIDERING ISSUES PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED IN
NONFINAL ORDERS.
It was error for the trial court to apply the law of the case doctrine because Judge
Henriod, newly assigned to the case, was able to reconsider all nonfinal orders made by the
previous judge earlier in the litigation. Application of the law of the case doctrine denied Salt
Lake County the ability to raise and pursue any defenses to either cause of action, including
those based upon governmental immunity.
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Judge Henriod concluded:
Statutory Entitlement
Under the law of the case doctrine, I adopt Judge Bohling's ruling with respect
to the issue of statutory entitlement. Accordingly, plaintiffs' claim is not barred
by the Governmental Immunity Act5 s doctrine of discretionary functions. UC A
§ 63-30-10(1).
Breach of Contract
Under the law of the case doctrine I adopt the conclusions of Judge Bohling with
respect to plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract and conclude that plaintiffs have
plead [sic] facts sufficient to state a claim for breach of contract.
[Addendum L,R. 3008].
Although the law of the case doctrine prevents one district court judge from
overruling another district court judge of equal authority, it does not prevent a judge from
reconsidering his or her previous nonfinal orders. Marcis v. Sculptured Software. Inc., 2001
UT 43,24 P.3d 984; Hah, 2001 UT 34, at f 12. In Marcis this Court addressed whether the
law of the case doctrine prevented reconsideration of Judge Stirba's order after the matter
was reassigned to Judge Quinn when Judge Stirba went on leave. In applying Rule 54(b),
this Court noted: "Judge Quinn's conclusion should be seen not as a ruling by a co-equal
court, but rather as the same judicial officer reconsidering a prior ruling." Marcis, 2002 UT
43, at 130.
This case is analogous to Marcis in that Judge Henriod was assigned the case after a
reorganization in the Third Judicial District. Therefore, when Judge Henriod was presented
with evidence and arguments at the summary judgment stage that no contract existed under
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state law or that particular claims were barred under the Governmental Immunity Act, he was
free to consider the merits of the County's defenses and the Deputies' claims, even if those
issues were considered and resolved by Judge Bohling in ruling on the County's Motion to
Dismiss.13
This Court should review the application of the doctrine under a correctness standard
and determine it was error for Judge Henriod to bar the County from disputing the existence
of an employment contract between the County and the Deputies or from raising defenses,
including jurisdictional ones, under the Governmental Immunity Act to the Deputies' claims.
III.
NEITHER RES JUDICATA NOR COLLATERAL
ESTOPPEL PRECLUDED THE COUNTY FROM
DEFENDING AGAINST THE CLAIMS FOR BACK
WAGES ASSERTED IN THIS ACTION, DESPITE
ITS PRIOR SETTLEMENT OF A SIMILAR WAGE
DISPUTE WITH OTHER DEPUTIES.
In denying Salt Lake County summary judgment and in granting the Deputies partial
summary judgment, the trial court applied the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
to prevent the County from raising or litigating defenses to the Deputies' claims for statutory
violation and contract breach. Specifically, the trial court stated:

13

Judge Bohling's order appears to be based upon the pleadings alone since he
stated that "plaintiffs have plead [sic] sufficient facts to state a claim for breach of
contract." Addendum H, R. 214. Judge Bohling was not called upon to conclude, nor did
he conclude, that a contract existed, much less that it had been breached. Judge Henriod,
however, viewed the earlier order as concluding Plaintiffs had already proved both the
existence and the breach of an employment contract.
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Arbitration
Defendants' [sic] contend that the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion preclude application of the arbitrator's ruling. However, I conclude
that the issues decided in arbitration were sufficiently similar to the issues in
the present case to meet the requirements of privity. Therefore, plaintiffs are
entitled to back pay under the arbitrator's order.[14]
Judge Henriod did not distinguish between the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel in his ruling, or indicate the cause of action on which he was granting a judgment
for monetary relief. Because of the uncertainty in the trial court's order, the County will
address the application of both res judicata and collateral estoppel.
Whether res judicata or collateral estoppel preclude the County in this action from
defending itself on the Deputies' claims is a question of law which this court reviews for
correctness. See Press Publishing v. Matol Botanical Int'L 2000 UT 106, 37 P.3d 1121;
Marcris & Assocs. v. Neways. 2000 UT 93, f 17, 16 P.3d 1214; Marcis v. Sculptured
Software. Inc.. 2001 UT 43, 24 P.3d 984.
This Court has outlined the law relating to the doctrine of res judicata as follows:
The doctrine of res judicata embraces two distinct branches: claim preclusion
and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion involves the same parties or their
privies and also the same cause of action, "and this precludes the relitigation
of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that were in fact,
litigated in the prior action." Issue preclusion [also known as collateral
estoppel], on the other hand, "arises from a different cause of action and
prevents parties or their privies from relitigating facts and issues in a second
suit that were fully litigated in the first suit."
Marcris & Assocs.. 2000 UT 93, at f 17 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Schaerv. State. 657
P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983)).
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Although the court and the parties refer to Robert Adams as an arbitrator, he is in
fact a non-law trained mediator.

For res judicata (claim preclusion) to apply in a subsequent suit, three elements must
be established. First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one
that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits. IcL at f 20 (quoting Madsenv. Borthick, 769
P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)).
Different rules apply to the other branch of the doctrine, collateral estoppel (issue
preclusion). A party asserting it must establish four elements: (1) the party against whom
issue preclusion is asserted must have been a party to or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication, (2) the issue decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one
presented in the instant action; (3) the issue in the first action must have been completely,
fully, and fairly litigated; and (4) the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the
merits. Id at 137; In re General Determination of Rights to the Use of All the Water. 1999
UT 39, 982 P.2d 65.
The element common to both branches of the doctrine is that the prior proceeding
matter must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. That element is clearly lacking
in the instant case, which only resulted in a voluntary settlement of grievances after dismissal
of the Diamant lawsuit with prejudice.
This is not a case of applying preclusive effect to an arbitrated judgment. The
Diamant parties were not ordered into arbitration: they agreed to settled their differences out
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of court and be bound by that settlement. [See Addendum D]. Compare Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3 la-4 (1996). The Diamant lawsuit was not stayed pending the out-of-court settlement
proceedings to consider any grievances filed by individual deputies in accordance with the
settlement agreement; it was dismissed with prejudice. See id, § 78-31a-4(3) (1996).
Significantly, under section 78-3 la-16 of the Arbitration Act "[a]n award which is
confirmed, modified, or corrected by the court shall be treated and enforced in all respects
as a judgment."

Here, no arbitration award was returned to the district court for

confirmation, modification or correction. See id. § 78-3 la-12, -15 (1996). Thus, the awards
made after the Diamant settlement cannot be treated as final judgments for res judicata
purposes.
Neither can the Diamant court's order dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice be the
"final judgment on the merits" required for application of res judicata. In Miller v. USAA
Casualty Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,44 P.3d 663, Miller sought payment in an original lawsuit for
losses under his insurance contract. The district court ordered the matter to arbitration under
the appraisal provision of the contract and dismissed all claims filed. Thereafter, Miller filed
a second suit, and USAA raised res judicata as a bar. This Court held that the dismissal order
in the first suit was not an adjudication on the merits since "the district court never addressed
the merits of the allegation in the complaint, but simply dismissed the Millers' complaint
because the 'parties [were] bound by contract to settle the dispute in this case by appraisal."
Id. at f 62. Likewise, the trial court in the instant case never addressed the merits of
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Diamant's allegations, but simply dismissed the complaint with prejudice because the parties
agreed to settle the dispute in another manner.
The Deputies also failed to establish another element required for claim preclusion,
namely, that both cases involved the same parties or their privies. The legal definition of a
person in privity with another is a person so identified in interest with another that he
represents the same legal right. Searle Bros, v. Searle. 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978).
Although both lawsuits involved deputies, the Deputies here have not established they
are in privity with the deputies in the prior action. To do so, the Deputies had to show that
they were persons whose interests were legally represented in the Diamant lawsuit. Id. They
cannot make this showing because the Diamant lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice without
a judgment on the merits and, in any event, was never certified as a class action to include
deputies not named as plaintiffs, including the plaintiff Deputies in this action.
Additionally, although collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) does not require mutuality
of parties when it is asserted defensively against private litigants, Robertson v. Campbell.
647 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah 1983), the trial court erred in allowing the Deputies to assert
collateral estoppel against the County without requiring full mutuality of parties. This Court
has not yet determined whether the element of nonmutuality of parties applies when collateral
estoppel is asserted defensively against the State and other governmental entities. State v.
Perank, 858 P.2d 927,931 n.3 (Utah 1993). The County asks this Court to do so in this case
and conclude it does not.

Under federal law it has long been the rule that full mutuality of parties is required
when collateral estoppel is asserted against the government. United States v. Mendoza. 464
U.S. 154 (1984); see Allen v. McCurrv. 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Sunnen. 333 U.S. 591 (1948). The same full mutuality rule has been applied
when parties have sought to estop state governments based on previous lawsuits. E.g..
Hercules Carriers. Inc. v. Florida. 768 F.2d 1558.1577-82 (11th Cir. 1985). This is because
of overriding policy considerations that militate against paralyzing government from
defending itself, which is the outcome if it is forever bound by the results in the first of many
lawsuits by different parties raising the same legal issue. As the Supreme Court noted:
"[T]he government is not in a position identical to that of a private litigant both because of
the geographical breadth of government litigation and.. because of the nature of the issues
the government litigates. . . . Because of those facts the government is more likely than a
private party to be involved in lawsuits against different parties which nonetheless involve
the same legal issues." _Id at 163-64 (citations omitted).
Because the Deputies failed to establish all the elements necessary to give preclusive
effect to the Diamant awards, the trial court erred in applying either res judicata and
collateral estoppel and preventing the County from defending itself in this action on the
Deputies'claims.
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IV.
THE DEPUTY SHERIFFS' MERIT ACT AND THE COUNTY
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-30-5
AND § 17-33-5, AND THE IMPLEMENTING POLICIES DO NOT
CREATE AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT ENFORCEABLE BY
PLAINTIFF DEPUTIES.
The trial court further erred in determining there was an employment contract between
the Deputies and the County based only on the statute authorizing the public employment of
the Deputies, Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-1 et seq., and its implementing regulations. Under
current Utah case law these were insufficient, as a matter of law, to create contractual
employment rights or to support a claim for breach of contract. See Knight v. Salt Lake
County, 2002 UT App 100,46 P.3d 247; Horn v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
The established weight of authority is that civil servants' employment rights are
statutory rather than contractual. See Horn, 962 P.2d at 101 (noting that other jurisdictions
have uniformly rejected the proposition that a public employment act and implementing
regulations, without more, create a contractual right); see also Thurston v. Box Elder County,
835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992) (concluding personnel manual could not alter or contradict
statutory rights given public employees in the County Personnel Management Act, section
17-33-1 et seq.) In Horn, the court rejected an argument, similar to that made by the Deputies
in this case, that the Utah State Personnel Management Act and its implementing regulations
gave rise to contractual employment rights. Horn, 962 P.2d at 100; see Thurston. 835 P.2d
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at 169-70 (holding that public employee's pleaded breach of contract claim was actually a
statutory claim under the State Personnel Management Act).
It is theoretically possible for a public employer and a public employee to enter into
a contractual agreement, apart from the governing statutes and regulations, that would
provide additional employee rights. E.g.. Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College. 636 P.2d
1063,1065-67 (Utah 1981) ("employment relationship with the college was governed by the
college's personnel manual and was therefore contractual rather than statutory."). However,
to do so the public employee would have to establish that he entered into a contractual
agreement that added to the terms and conditions of public employment in the governing
statute and implementing regulations. Horn. 962 P.2d at 100. In such an employment
contract, the public employer would have to voluntarily undertake an obligation it otherwise
had no duty to perform. Knight. 2002 UT App 100, atffif6, 14 (citing Ryan v. Dan's Food
Stores. Inc.. 972 P.2d 395. 400-401 (Utah 1998V).
The Deputies made no such showing here. They presented to the trial court only the
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-5,15 the "policies of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office,

15

Section §17-30-5 provides:

The commission shall formulate a comprehensive job classification plan
covering all peace officers of the governmental unit. The plan shall place all
positions requiring substantially the same duties and qualifications in the
same classification and shall include minimum physical and educational
qualifications of the applicants for each position, and provide standards of
promotion. The commission shall adopt a classification plan which shall be
the basis of the administration of this act until changed with the approval of
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and the policies and procedures of the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs Merit
Commission," and argued that these created an employment contract. [R. 713-714]. This
statute and the other referenced by the Deputies, Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii),16
mandate the creation of merit systems for hiring, classifying, promoting, retaining and
discharging County employees but they give discretion to the governmental entity to establish
standards for hiring and promotion. As in Horn, no reasonable factfinder could find that the
County and the Deputies had entered into a contractual agreement that altered or added to the
terms of the Deputies' public employment. Knight, 2002 UT App 100, at ^f 10. In short, the
Deputies presented no evidence that the County undertook any obligations to them other than
any created by statute.
Because the deputies failed to demonstrate that the parties entered into any contractual
relationship apart from their relationship as statutory employer and employees under the
Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act and implementing regulations, the trial court erred in failing to
dismiss the Deputies' cause of action for breach of contract.

the commission. In the event a new position is created and approved by the
governing body, such position shall automatically be classified and become
a part of the classification plan.
16

This statute has no relevance in this dispute since it applies to civilian employees,
not to these sworn deputies.

V.
THE DEPUTY SHERIFFS' MERIT ACT AND THE
COUNTY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-30-5 AND § 17-33-5, AND THE
IMPLEMENTING POLICIES DO NOT CREATE FOR
DEPUTIES A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
FOR THEIR ENFORCEMENT.
The trial court also erred when it granted the Deputies summary judgment and
damages on their claim for breach of statute. Neither section 17-30-5 nor 17-33-5(3)(b)(xiii)
(which, in any event, does not apply to sworn officers) creates a private right of action for
enforcement of the statute and its implementing policies.
Under Utah case law, a trial court may not, without explicit language conferring a
private right of action, read one into a statute. Snow Flower Homeowners Assoc, v. Snow
Flower. Ltd.. 2001 UT App 207, 31 P.3d 576; Adkins v. Uncle Bart's Inc.. 2000 UT 14, 1
P.3d 528. Moreover, "the courts of this state are not generally in the habit of implying a
private right of action based upon state law, absent some specific direction from the
Legislature." Broadbent v. Board of Education of Cache County. 910 P.2d 1274, 1279
(Utah App. 1996) (citing Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co.. 529 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1974)
(stating that, where a criminal statute did not provide private right of action, the matter is best
left to legislature^: see also J.H. bv D.H. v. West Valley City. 840P.2d 115,125 (Utah 1992)
(declining to create private right of action to challenge city's failure to follow specific
procedure in hiring officers). In words equally as relevant in the instant case, this Court
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recently urged the judiciary to be extremely cautious about creating a common law monetary
remedy for violation of a constitutional tort:
We urge caution in light of the myriad policy considerations involved in a
decision to award damages against a governmental agency and/or its employee
for a constitutional violation. Moreover, we urge deference to existing
remedies out of respect for separation of power principles. In general, the
legislative branch has the authority, and in many cases is better suited, to
establish appropriate remedies for individual injuries. By requiring courts to
defer to relevant legislative determinations of appropriate remedies, we respect
the legislature's important role in our constitutional system of government.

Spackmanexrel. Spackmanv. Board of Educ. of Box Elder County, 2002 UT 87, f 24,16
P.3d533.
Here, the statutes that the Deputies relied upon clearly vest the County legislative
body with the discretion to develop a compensation plan and pay practices taking into
account market variables. Allowing a private remedy, which in essence asks the courts to
establish a compensation plan it views as equitable, is contrary to the legislature's decision
to vest the County Commission with that power.
Nothing in the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act expressly authorizes a private right of
action by deputies to challenge a job classification plan or compensation plan adopted by the
County or the Commission. Instead, the plain language of the above cited statute clearly
demonstrates an intent on the part of the Utah Legislative to empower each of the various
counties, through their legislative and policy-making bodies, broad discretion to create a job
"classification" plan for employees consistent with the individual needs of that county.17

17

The decision of the Salt Lake County Commission to establish its compensation
plan or a specific County policy is entitled to deference and generally will not be

The language of the statute is devoid of any legislative intent to create a right for
employees to enforce the statute and sue for back wages18 if they do not like the plan created
in accord with the statute's directive. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the
Deputies' statutory cause of action.
VI.
EVEN IF THERE WERE SUCH A STATUTORY RIGHT OF
ACTION, THE COUNTY AND THE SHERIFF ARE
IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT FOR ANY INJURY RESULTING
FROM THEIR ADOPTION AND APPLICATION OF A
COMPENSATION PLAN FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES.

Under the Governmental Immunity Act, all governmental entities are immune from
suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-30-3(1) (1997). Salt Lake County is a governmental entity under the Act. Id. § 6330-2(3), (7) (1997). Here, the Deputies' claim for monetary damages indisputably results
from a governmental function, namely, the County's adoption and use of a classification plan

interfered with by the courts. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of
Springville. 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332.
18

There may be other available remedies. For example, under the Deputy Sheriffs'
Merit System Act, "A person aggrieved by an act or failure to act of any merit system
commission under this act may appeal to the district court, if he has exhausted his
remedies of appeal to the commission. The courts may review questions of law and fact
and may affirm, set aside, or modify the ruling complained of." Utah Code Ann. § 17-3020 ( 2001). And a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus is available
to force public officials to perform their statutory duties or to claim relief from the
exercise of unlawful authority. See Greene v. Morgan County Commissioners. 2000 UT
54, 4 P.3d 789 (2000); Walker v. Weber County, 973 P.2d 927 (Utah 1998).
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and compensation plan for all public employees who provide law enforcement services in the
County as deputy sheriffs.
If this Court were to recognize an implicit cause of action in the deputies to enforce
the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act, under section 63-30-3 the County would still remain immune
from suit for remedial damages in that enforcement action. The legislature has not waived
governmental immunity for such a claim. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-5 to -10 (1997).
For this reason, the Deputies' cause of action for monetary damages resulting from
any violation of the Deputy Sheriffs' Merit Act should have been dismissed as precluded by
the Governmental Immunity Act.
VII.
THE COUNTY IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW ON ANY STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE
THE COUNTY HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTES
BY USING AN EQUITABLE COMPENSATION PLAN AND POLICIES.

Alternatively, if a private right of action for damages exists to enforce the Deputy
Sheriffs' Merit Act, the County is nonetheless entitled to judgment on this statutory claim
because it has complied with the requirements of the law and its own implementing
regulations.
The statutory provisions relied upon by the Deputies required only adoption of a
classification plan, personnel rules meeting the requirements of Utah Code §17-335(3)(b)(xiii), and uniform application of the adopted compensation plan and policies.
The County presented undisputed evidence that it established "a comprehensive job
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compensation plan" which placed "all positions requiring substantially the same duties and
qualifications in the same classification." [See Addendum I, R. 446-447]. II was also
undisputed that the County's policies and compensation plan were uniformly applied. [R.
4181 at 557].
The Deputies claimed that any pay differentials between a senior employee and a less
senior employee of the same class resulted in a violation of statute. Yet they offered no
statutory or policy language to support this. The Deputies also claimed that the County's
compensation system must be based on seniority of experience with the County itself. Yet
they offered no statutory or policy language to support this.
Because the County is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the statutory
violation claims, based on the undisputed facts presented to the trial court, the judgment
entered in the Deputies' favor should be vacated.
VIIL
EVEN IF THE COUNTY WERE NOT IN COMPLIANCE,
THE 19 DEPUTIES' STATUTORY CLAIMS ARE
BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE 3-YEAR STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS, WHICH BEGAN TO RUN NO
LATER THAN JANUARY 1992, WHEN THE DEPUTIES
WERE PAID UNDER THE CHALLENGED COMPENSATION
PLAN AND POLICIES.
The trial court also erred by not applying the correct statute of limitations to the
Deputies' statutory cause of action and by failing to address when the Deputies' claim
accrued, triggering the running of that limitations period.

The 3-year limitations period in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4) (1996) applies to the
Deputies' claim for damages due to violation of a state statute. Horn. 962 P.2d at 101;
see Knight, 2002 UT App 100, at ^f 17. The limitations period begins to run when the cause
of action accrues. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1996); Department of Natural Resources v.
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, atffif 23-24, 52 P.3d 1257; see Davidson
Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv., Inc., 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990). Generally, a
cause of action accrues when "it becomes remediable in the courts, that is when the claim is
in such condition that the courts can proceed and give judgment if the claim is established."
Department of Natural Resources v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, at ^f
24 (quoting State Tax Common v. Spanish Fork, 100 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1940)). When the
claim is for a statutory violation, the cause of action does not accrue, triggering the
limitations period in section 78-12-26(4), until the plaintiff suffers injury. Id., 2002 UT 75,
atfflf 23-24: see Sealev. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361,1364 (Utah 1996); DOIT, Inc. v. Touche.
Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 843 (Utah 1996) ("As a general rule, a cause of action accrues
when an plaintiff could have first filed and prosecuted an action to successful completion.").
In this case, the alleged statutory violation occurred when the compensation plan was
adopted and the implementing policies were applied by the County to deprive the Deputies
of equitable pay. All the plaintiff Deputies had been hired and paid by the County by January

19

"An action may be brought within three years: . . . (4) for a liability created by the
statutes of this state . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(4) (1996).
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1992. [R. 2842-2849]. Thus, they were injured by the purportedly inequitable pay scheme
no later than January 1992. This is the point in time when their statutory claims would have
become actionable and redressable in the courts. Thus, their statutory cause of action
accrued, triggering the running of the 3-year limitations period in section 78-12-26(4), no
later than January 1992. See Retherford v. AT&T Communications, Inc.. 844 P.2d 949,
975 (Utah 1992); see also Spears v. Warr. 2002 UT 24, atffif32-33, 44 P.3d 742.
The Deputies filed this action in January 1996, more than three years after their
statutory cause of action accrued. [R. 1-31]. Thus, their statutory claim for damages was
barred by the statute of limitations in section 78-12-26(4). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1
(1996) ("Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in this chapter,
after the cause of action has accrued....").
For this reason, the trial court erred in awarding judgment to the Deputies on their
statutory claim.
IX.
EVEN IF THE 19 DEPUTIES' STATUTORY CLAIMS
ARE NOT BARRED, THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED
TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
If an award of back pay to the Deputies is warranted, it was nonetheless error for the
trial court to grant prejudgment interest because the determination of what is equitable

20

The only exception is Gary Haddock, but he was not one of the 19 deputies who
filed a notice of claim and, in any event, he was not awarded any back pay in the final
judgment entered in this case. Judgment was awarded against Haddock and in favor or
the County on his claims. [Addendum M, R. 4021-4022].
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compensation is not readily calculated. The trial court's decision on entitlement to
prejudgment interest presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. Vali Convalescent
& Care Insts. v. Division of Health Care Fin.. 797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990).
Under Utah law, prejudgment interest represents an amount awarded as damages due
to the defendant's delay in tendering an amount clearly owing under an agreement or other
obligation. Campbell Maack & Sessions v. Debrv. 2001 UT App 397, ^ 23, 38 P.3d 984.
It may only be awarded in situations where the damage is complete, the loss can be measured
by facts and figures, and the amount of loss is fixed as of a particular time. Bjork v. April
Indus.. Inc.. 560 P.2d 315, 317 (Utah), cert denied. 431 U.S. 930 (1977). Prejudgment
interest is appropriate where the factfinders can follow "fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value rather than be[ing] guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount"
or evaluating elements lacking fixed standards by which to measure their value. Andreason
v. Aetna Casualty. 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993); (citing Fell v. Union Pacific Rv.
Co.. 88 P. 1003, 1007 (1907)). Where damages are "incomplete and peculiarly within the
province of the jury to access at the time of trial, prejudgment interest is inappropriate. Id.
The trial court's decision in this case is a determination of its best judgment in
assessing what is "equitable" compensation either under an employment contract or the
requirements of statute. The contract claim presented to the court was based upon the same
wording as the Deputies' claim for statutory entitlement, but the statute itself does not
contain or define the words "equitable compensation." The trial court's determination-that
what the Diamant grievants received was "equitable"-is a factual determination not based
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upon fixed rules of evidence or known standards of value. To determine damages, the trial
court directed each Deputy to select a less senior employee and compare their salaries to
demonstrate a compensable pay inequity. The Deputies were awarded any difference in
salary for the 4 Vi year recovery period.
In Andreason, supra, the court reviewed a denial of prejudgment interest to
homeowners who maintained credible recordings of their repair expenses. The homeowners
argued that they had created a mathematical certainty of their loss. Instead, the court found
their recording of expenses did "not provide a known standard of value for measuring
damages in a promissory estoppel case." 848 P.2d at 177. The court held that damages did
not become "fixed" before a factfinder quantified the injustice caused by detrimental
reliance. Id.
Similarly, in this case the Deputies' damages did not become fixed before the trial
judge quantified the loss as the difference in the salary received and the amount another
selected deputy had been paid. It was not until the trial court quantified each Deputy's loss
that damages could be calculated with any certainty.
Since damages were not fixed until trial, it was error for the trial court to award
prejudgment interest on the damages awarded in this case. Assuming the judgment in the
Deputies' favor is not vacated in its entirety, this Court should vacate that part of the
judgment awarding prejudgment interest.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons in Points I-V, the County asks this Court to vacate the
summary judgment entered in favor of the Deputies and to remand the case to the trial court

with directions to dismiss with prejudice all claims of all 124 plaintiffs.
If the Court concludes the 19 Deputies who filed a notice of claim have stated a
statutory claim for relief, the County asks this Court for the reasons in Points VI-VIII to
vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of the Deputies and remand the case to the
trial court with directions to enter judgment in the County's favor because: the Deputies'
claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations the County retains immunity for
adopting the challenged compensation plan and policies; or the challenged compensation
plan and policies are equitable and fully comply with the governing statutes.
Alternatively, if the Court concludes the Deputies are entitled to judgment as a matter
of law on their statutory claims, the County asks this Court to modify the judgment in favor
of the Deputies by: eliminating judgment and all damages awarded to the 105 Deputies who
failed to file a notice of claim required by the Governmental Immunity Act; and eliminating
the award of prejudgment interest to the 15 plaintiffs awarded damages who did file a notice
of claim.21
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of November, 2002.
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These fifteen deputies are identified on the list of plaintiffs, supra at i-ii, with a %
after their names.
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